Mobile Ad Hoc Networks (MANETs) are susceptible to a variety of attacks that threaten their operation and the provided services. Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) may act as defensive mechanisms, since they monitor network activities in order to detect malicious actions performed by intruders, and then initiate the appropriate countermeasures. IDSs for MANETs have attracted much attention recently and thus, there are many publications that propose new IDS solutions or improvements to the existing. Current IDSs pose challenges on not only capricious intrusion categories, but also huge computational power. Though there are a number of existing literatures to IDS issues, an attempt is made to give a more elaborate image for a comprehensive review on IDSs based on stand-alone architecture for MANETs, because of the uniqueness to identify the attack solely. In addition, the table and the figure summarized in the content contribute to easily grasp the overall picture of stand-alone IDSs along with existing open issues.
Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is a collection of autonomous nodes that form a dynamic, purpose-specific, multi-hop radio network in a decentralized fashion. The main advantage is flexibility, adaptability, eased cooperation and efficient communication in environments without the help of any fixed infrastructure or centralized management point. Despite the many advantages, MANETs are inherently vulnerable to various attacks due to some features such as open medium, dynamic topology, lack of centralized management and control points etc. [18] .An effective way to identify an attack occurs in a MANET is the deployment of an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). The IDS is introduced to detect possible violations of a security policy by monitoring system activities and responding to those that are apparently intrusive. It also provides information about intrusion techniques, enhancing the understanding of attacks and informing the decisions regarding prevention and mitigation.
IDS can be categorized using three different ways [4, 17] :
Based on the architecture, which exemplifies the operational structure of the IDS ;
(ii) Based on detection engine, which is the mechanism used to detect malicious behaviors; (iii) Based on data collection technique, which is the mechanism used to collect and intercept data.
IDS for MANETs have attracted much attention recently and thus, there are many publications that propose new IDS solutions or improvements to the existing IDSs, focusing on IDS architectures. The existing IDS architectures for MANETs fall under four basic categories [4, 16] :
a) The stand-alone architecturesuse an intrusion detection engine installed on each node utilizing only the node's local audit data.
b) The distributed and cooperative architecturesinclude an intrusion detection engine installed on every node, which monitors local audit data and exchanges audit data and/or detection outcomes with neighboring nodes in order to resolve inconclusive detections.
c) Thehierarchical architecturesamount to a multilayer approach, by dividing the network into clusters. Specific nodes are selected (based on specific criteria) to act as cluster heads and undertake various responsibilities and roles in intrusion detection that are usually different from those of the simple cluster members.
d) The Mobile Agent based architectures are applied in MANETs as a concept in the same intrusion detection techniques. These agents can move easily throughout a major network and each has a specific duty. Because one or more agents can be placed inside a node, the intrusion detection operation can be distributed throughout the network. The figure 1 in Appendix A shows the classification of IDS based on above discussion and different approaches for the stand-alone architecture.
The distributed and cooperative approach imposes an extraprocessing workload at each node as detection is carried out at local and global level [5] . On the other hand, in standalone architecture detection is carried out only locally.
The hierarchical architectures impose unfair workload distribution among the network nodes,since the nodes elected as cluster-heads are overloaded with detection responsibilities in accordance with reelections of the cluster heads. On the other hand, in stand-alone architecture each node comprises same workload as each node has the same detection engine installed independently.
For Mobile Agent based architectures each agent migrates from one host to another taking the code, data and state with them. This as a whole reduces network bandwidth. It decreases the computation overhead in each node in the network [6] . However, it imposes extra communication overhead as mobile agent needs to be migrated among the nodes. On the other hand, the stand-alone architecture does not require the detection engine to be migrated. 
RELATED WORK
In stand-alone architecture, an intrusion detection system runs on each node independently to determine intrusions. Every decision made is based only on information collected at its own node, since there is no cooperation among nodes in the network. Besides, nodes in the same network do not know anything about the situation on other nodes in the network, as no alert information is passed.
A very first approach to stand-alone architecture proposed by Bansal and Baker (2003) [14] is an extension on top of the DSR protocol called OCEAN (Observation-based Cooperation Enforcement in Adhoc Networks).The objective of this approach is to avoid trust-management using a monitoring system and a reputation system for neighbor node's behavior. OCEAN considers two types of routing misbehavior: misleading and selfish behavior using faulty threshold and chip counts mechanisms. Kabiri and Aghaei (2011) [11] presented an anomaly-based Feature Analysis technique that focuses on denial of service attacks. The proposed system gets benefit from its neighbors' normal behaviors and analyzes them based on the optimal features. This approach is based on feature selection method and it applies Principal Component Analysis (PCA) theory to determine network operating conditions. 
COMPARISON CRITERIA
This section focuses on different performance parameters, implementation environment, addressed attacks and open issues as the comparison criteria for each stand-alone IDS, which is then summarized in Table 1 (Appendix B).
Implementation Environment
To measure and validate the effectiveness of any approach, the implementation environment is an essential criterion to the detection mechanism under the different network scenarios.
In In Two Staged [9] IDS, first, a static set of behaviors is determined offline, and these behaviors are tracked dynamically during the operation of the network with the combination of MDS and CCDS detection engines. The testing of this approach is performed on the small scaled embedded devices. Data generation is performed in a MATLAB script that simulated the mission data based on a probability density function, with two real time scenarios of ADS-B and Massively Distributed Micro robotics. 
Processing Overhead
The processing overhead refers to the type of detection engine and the algorithms utilized. They are responsible for data collection to find anomaly from available data. The more complex algorithm will incur higher processing power, higher detection time, and more battery power, which are the constraints for IDSs in MANET.
The OCEAN [14] is less complex, incurs less processing overhead, as it eliminates trust management complexity using faulty threshold and chip counts mechanisms.
In Threshold Based [8] IDS, audit data analysis of network information along with Threshold Analysis Module to adapt network behavior by varying the threshold to identify attacks, incurs some processing overhead.
The Unobtrusive Monitoring [10] based IDSincludes a detection algorithm, which is less complex as only routing protocol error messages, TCP timeouts and retransmission times are utilized to identify the anomaly in routing protocols, incurs less processing overhead.
In Battery Based [7] stand-alone IDS, the processing overhead is higher since the power signatures captured by HIDE are processed with FFT and chi square test to find close attack signatures, which arethen, compared with known attack signatures by HASTE. Also the SPIE needs to ascertain the IP and port source of the attack.
Because of adaptive learning processing in Dynamic Anomaly Detection Based [13] IDS the complexity of the algorithm is higher which incurs higher power and processing overhead.
Despite of two detection engines the HyberIDS of Two Staged [9]
IDS performs well and incurs lessprocessing overhead by using situational awareness to reduce the need for large and complex computations.
The Feature analysis Based [11] approach intends to reduce the dimensionality of the network features using PCA and covariance matrix which incur less processing overhead.
In Cross Layer [12] detection based IDS, processing overhead is higher, which includes computational complexity of both periodic retraining of the SVM base model and the detection complexity of the kernel function. Besides, the numbers of features are reduced using data reduction techniques.
Detection Accuracy
This determines the rate of attacks detected correctly by IDS in a given environment during a particular time frame. This also includes the rate of false positives or negatives. A false positive is an alert caused by normal non-malicious 
Impact of Node's Mobility
Mobility makes the routes dynamic, i.e., an active route can become broken due to mobility. Here, the dropping of the packets becomes inevitable, as reestablishing a new route takes some time. Furthermore, mobility creates a changing channel and fading conditions [12] .
Increasing the mobility of the nodein OCEAN [14] decreasesthe detection accuracy as it is more sensitive to the tuning of the Faulty threshold parameter. High mobilityincreasesthe rate of false positives.
In Threshold Based [8] IDS, increasing the mobility of the nodeaffects very less on detection accuracy and rate of false positives.
Increasing the mobility of the nodedecreasesthe detection accuracy and increases the rate of false positives in Unobtrusive Monitoring Based [10] IDS.
In Dynamic Anomaly Detection [13] based IDS,an increase in the mobility of the node decreasesthe detection accuracy and increases the rate of false positives.
High mobility of the node and the traffic density does not affect the detection accuracy and the rate of false positives in Feature Analysis Based [11] IDS, since the response of the system shows same deviations for the selected parameters.
In Cross Layer [12] IDS, high mobility makes a negligible drop (less than 1% hence negligible) in detection accuracy and the rate of false positives.
Traffic / Node Density
Network traffic density or the node density is a crucial factor. They determine how dense the background activities and interference, which will aid in camouflaging malicious behaviors. This affects the detection efficiency [12] . Increasing the node density inThreshold Based [8] slightly decreases the detection accuracy and increases average endto-end delay at the initial time.
Network traffic density does not affect the detection accuracy and false positives in Feature Analysis Based [11] IDS.
In Cross Layer [12] IDS, cross-layer methods experience a negligible drop in detection efficiency while traffic density increases.
Detection Interval
Detection interval specifies the duration within which a source node keeps track of all the control messages received at that node. The detection interval means that a node has to store information for a longer period of time. If the node is receiving a lot of messages, this can drastically increase the storage overhead which is a burden on the memory constrained mobile nodes. Therefore, the choice of the detection interval has a very significant impact on the performance of IDS [10] .
However, only the Unobtrusive Monitoring Based [10] IDS signifies the detection interval. Increasing the detection interval lowers the detection effectiveness and lowers the number of false positives and vice versa.
Scalability
An important aspect of the IDS is its ability to scale to larger networks. Adding more nodes to the ad-hoc network should minimally impact the efficiency of the IDS [9] . 
Addressed Attacks
Detecting Intrusion is difficult, particularly in the wireless domain. IDS often attempts to differentiate abnormal activities from the normal ones. Unfortunately, normal activities can be varied, and an attack may have resemblance to normal activities. For any IDS, the ability to identify the type of attacks is the most attractive feature. 
Open Issues
Even if some of the described IDSs do well towards securing the MANET, enhancing solutions are required to their limitations and weaknesses, which constitute open issues that will drive the next steps in the research area of MANET security. The study reveals that many gaps still exist for detecting intrusions.
In OCEAN [14] , the performance falls drastically for low number of misleading nodes. It is more sensitive to some parameter settings and does not punish misbehaving nodes as severely as systems using full-blown reputationinformation. Also, it is not effective in thwarting the throughput of misleading nodes. The authentication mechanism is also required to avoid spoofing of legitimate node's identity. 
4.CONCLUSION &FUTURE DIRECTION
This paper evaluates and compares the latest and most prominent stand-alone IDS architectures for MANETs along with performance aspects and present significant limitations. Also, Table 1 (Appendix A) shows, much of the stand-alone architectures can identify a limited set of attacks due to lack of cooperation and failed to identify coordinated attacks. Some of the evaluated IDS architectures cannot detect all types of attacks [7, 11, 12] , since they focus only on specific types of intrusions.The number of new attacks is likely to increase quickly and those attacks should be detected before they can do any harm to the systems or data. Hence, IDS's in MANETs prefer using anomaly detection. Most approaches are proposed to implement on top of the existing protocols [10,11,12, and13] . Most of the above described IDSs are simulated [8, 10, 11, 12, and 13] . The processing overhead in most of the IDSs is less [9, 10, 11, and 14] . However, the impact of nodes' mobility and density decrease the detection accuracy in most of the stand-alone IDSs [8, 10, 12, 13, and 14] . The impact of detection interval, the most essential parameter for the performance of any IDS, is not even addressed by any of the described IDSs except [10] . However, out of them Feature Analysis Based IDS [11] is the most promising candidate because of high detection accuracy andless computational overhead. The salient feature of the IDS is it has no effect on traffic density and nodes' mobility. However, it only addresses the DoS attacks and considers the DSR routing protocol. The future direction includes expansion of the feature analysis approach that can focus on other routing and misbehaving attacks such that the approach would be the best fitted. Also the approach can be made protocol independent so that it can be deployed over a wide area.
